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COMMERCIAL LAW
FREDERICK M. HART

r

VEN a quick glance at the 1961 cases indicates that this has been
C a provocative year for the lawyer interested in commercial law.
However, although seven states1 adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code during the past year, and it appears likely that another 2 will be
added to the list before the end of this year, there has been no legislative action on the Code in New York since the last Survey. A new
study3 of its projected effect on New York law has been completed,
and it seems likely that the Code will be introduced in the legislature
during the coming session. If acceptance of the Code continues elsewhere the desirability of its adoption in New York will no longer
center on its intrinsic value, but rather on the question of whether this
state can afford to forego the benefits of having uniform legislation in
this area.
I
SALES

Vendors' Liability-Warranty-Privity.-Greenberg v. Lorenz 4
is clearly the most significant sales case to be decided during the past
year. This litigation, first noted in the 1958 Survey/ was reported
in three separate opinions while in the lower courts. 0 It exemplifies the
current controversy7 over whether privity of contract is essential to
recovery in a warranty action.
Frederick M. Hart is Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School
and a Member of tbe New York and District of Columbia Bars.
1. Arkansas, Illinois, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Wyoming. Sec
30 U.S.L. Week 2076 (Aug. 8, 1961).
2. The Code has passed one house of the legislature in New Jersey, and indications
are tbat it will be passed by the other house before the end of 1961. The State of New
Jersey Study of the Uniform Commercial Code (1960) under the direction of Professor William D. Hawkland is excellent.
3. Hogan, Annotations of the Statutory and Decisional Law of New York State
(1961).
4. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
5. Hart, Commercial Law, 1958 Survey of N.Y. Law, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1146,
1157.
6. 14 Misc. 2d 279, 178 N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957), aff'd, 12 Misc. 2d
883, 178 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st Dep't 1958), modified mcm., 7 App.
Div. 2d 968, 183 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1st Dep't 1959). The lower court opinions were noted
in 23 Albany L. Rev. 451 (1959) and 44 Cornell L.Q. 608 (1959). For an excellent
Note on the Court of Appeals decision, see 25 Albany L. Rev. 332 (1961).
7. See Hart, supra note 5; Hart, Commercial Law, 1959 Survey of N.Y. Law,
34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1442. For additional cases reported during the current Survey period
on the privity question, see General Aniline & Film Corp. v. A. Schrader & Son, 13
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The facts of Greenberg are simple: plaintiff, a minor, was injured
when she ate canned salmon purchased by her father from the defendant retailer. The issue is not obscure: may the plaintiff recover in
warranty though she is not in privity with the defendant? Equally
obvious is the answer if the court were to follow past precedent: recovery must be denied.8 The court clearly recognized this: "Our
difficulty is not in finding the applicable rule but in deciding whether
or not to change it." 9 Nor did the court doubt the desirability of a
change: "The injustice of denying damages to a child because of nonprivity seems too plain for argument. 1110 The one aspect of the problem which did cause the court momentary hesitation was whether
abandonment of the privity requirement in the Greenberg-type case
should come by judicial decision rather than legislative enactment.
The reasons given by the court for discarding the rule previously adopted in New York are neither novel nor surprising. "[T]he
present rule," the court said, "is itself of judicial making since our
statutes say nothing at all about privity." 11 Text writers were cited
for the proposition that in early times warranty liability was thought
to be in tort, and the court indicated that "alteration of the law in such
matters has been the business of the New York courts for many
years." 12
Thus, the citadel of privity has suffered further undermining in this
state. The court, however, made no pretense of handling the entire
privity question, for it cautiously remarked that other factual situations may exist where the privity requirement will be found to be
advantageous.13 The decision effects no more of a change than is contained in the Uniform Commercial Code. 14 Furthermore, relaxation of
the rule where a consumer who is a member of the purchaser's household sues the immediate vendor had been accomplished to a large extent in New York prior to Greenberg by the use of agency princiApp. Div. 2d 359, 215 N.Y.S.2d 861 (3d Dep't 1961) ; Canter v. American Cyanimid
Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 691, 207 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dcp't 1960) (mem.); Dccvcs , ••
Fabric Fire Hose Co., 29 Misc. 2d 136, 210 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct., Westch. Co. 1961);
Bolle v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 25 Misc. 2d 475, 205 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Sup. CL, Queens
Co. 1960).
8. See, e.g., Redmond v. Borden Farm Prods. Co., 245 N.Y. 512, 157 N.E. 838
(1927) (mem.); Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
9. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 198, 173 N.E.2d 773, 774, 213 N.Y.S.2d
39, 41 (1961).
10. Id. at 199, 173 N.E.2d at 775, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 775, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
13. Id. at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 775-76, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
14. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318.
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ples. 15 The more subtle problems that exist where the plaintiff is attempting to skip over his immediate vendor to sue a wholesaler, distributor or manufacturer were not present either to trouble the court,
or to temper its sympathy for the plaintiff.
Tlie nucleus of the court's opinion is contained in one short
paragraph which is worthy of close inspection:
So convincing a showing of injustice and impracticality calls upon
us to move but we should be cautious and take one step at a time.
To decide the case before us, we should hold that the infant's cause of
action should not have been dismissed solely on the ground that the
food was purchased not by the child but by the child's father. Today
when so much of our food is bought in packages it is not just or sensible to confine the warranty's protection to the individual buyer. At
least as to food and household goods, the presumption should be that
the purchase was made for all members of the household.10
Two important conclusions may be drawn from the court's treatment of the case: (1) all the judges except Judge Froessel, who concurred in a separate opinion,17 agreed that alteration of the privity
requirement was within the domain of the courts ·and need not be left
for the legislature; and (2) the court refused to anticipate its decision
on privity questions where the factual situation differs from the Greenberg case.
Vendors' Liability-Warranty-Existence of Warranty and
Breach.-Napoli v. St. Peter's Hospital, 18 a defective blood case, presents a variation from Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital. 10 In Perlmutter, the Court of Appeals held that no implied warranty accompanied a transfusion of blood by a hospital since the contract between
a hospital and its patient was one for services and not of sale. Subsequently, the appellate division of the third department held that a
hospital patient injured by defective blood could not sue the processor
who had sold the blood to the hospital in warranty because of the
lack of privity.20 In the Napoli case plaintiff sued the hospital, alleg15. See Mouren v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 1 N.Y.2d 884, 136 N.E.2d 715 1
154 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1956) (mem.) ; Bowman v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 284 App.
Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S.2d 904 (4th Dep't 1954), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165
(1955). See also N.Y. State Law Rev. Comm'n Rep., Legis. Doc. No. 65(B) (1959);
N.Y. State Law Rev. Comm'n Rep., Legis. Doc. No. 65(J) (1943).
16. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 173 N.E.2d 773, 775, 213 N.Y.S.2d
39, 42 (1961).
17. Judge Froessel would have allowed recovery on the ground that the father
had acted as the agent of his daughter. 9 N.Y.2d at 200, 173 N.E.2d nt 776, 213
N.Y.S.2d at 43.
18. 213 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1961).
19. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
20. Krom v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.Y.S.2d 99 (3d
Dep't 1958) (mem.).
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ing not an implied but an express warranty that the blood was fit.
On a motion to dismiss the complaint, the court held that a good
cause of action was alleged. Distinguishing the Perlmutter case on
the ground that it decided only that no implied warranty accompanied
a transfusion of blood, the court stated that "parties can contract with
respect to any valid subject matter and bind each other thereto.,, 21
The language, if not the result, in the Napoli opinion is questionable. The Uniform Sales Act defines an e}..-press warranty as "any
affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods
. . . if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon/':?:? Hence, a
warranty under the sales act, and in the law of sales generally, may
be either a promise or a representation. Where it is the latter, the
necessary intent to give rise to a separate contract of warranty does
not exist.23 Nor is there anything in the statutory language to indicate
that a sale is less necessary to support an e.'\-press warranty than to
support an implied warranty.2'1
Whether a warranty was to be implied was also determinative in
Sanchez-Lopez v. Fedco Food Corp.2:j This case involved the classic
supermarket situation of a plaintiff selecting a bottled item which
exploded prior to his paying the purchase price. The court held that
an implied warranty existed in this case, distinguishing it from Day
v. Grand Union CoY- 6 on the facts. In the Da·y case the e.'\-plosion
had occurred immediately after the customer had removed the bottle
from the shelf; in Sanchez it did not explode until the plaintiff had
reached the checkout counter and the clerk was preparing to register
the item on the sales tape.
The factual difference between the two cases is hardly sufficient
to support contrary results. If the Sanclzez case is correct, the reason
must be found in broader principles,27 and the Day case eventually
21. 213 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
22. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 93.
23. 4 Williston; Contracts §§ 970-71 (rev. ed. 1936). Cf. Hawkins \'. McGee, 84
N.H. 114, 146 Atl. 641 (1929).
24. For a strong argument that a warranty should be found in senice contracts,
see Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 Colum. L. Rev.
653, 660-66 (1957). However, Farnsworth does not favor stretching the concept of a
sale to :fit such situations. Instead he would impose a warranty which is analogous
to the warranties which.accompany sales of goods. Id. at 667-74.
25. 27 Misc. 2d 131, 211 N.Y.S.2d 953 (N.Y. City Ct. 1961).
26. 280 App. Div. 253, 113 N.Y.S.2d 436 (3d Dep't), afi'd, 304 N.Y. 821, 109
N.E.2d 609 (1952).
27. The court also supported its holding with the statement that "by presenting
himself to the cashier ·with his merchandise cart for the purpose of registering his
purchases and paying for them, plaintiff evin~d a definite intention to accept the
offer of the seller. A bilateral .contract of sale was thereupon effectively entered into
. . • ." 27 Misc. 2d at 134, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 956-57.
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must be overturned. It would appear that the court was struggling to
place upon the retailer the same liability that a .seller of goods has in
warranty. It may be socially desirable to afford such protection to
one who has carried his product to a supermarket checkout counter, or
has the bottle in his cart at the time of the explosion, or perhaps to
a party who has handled it, or even to one injured as he walks by an
exploding bottle. However, to say that a warranty existed in the
Sanchez case because there was something more like a sale than there
was in the Day case is to distort the concept of the warranty cause
of action and to invite confusion.28
Another point in the Sanchez case is worth noting. Plaintiff failed
to submit any fragments of the bottle. Apparently because of this
failure the defendant disputed the sufficiency of the evidence to show
a breach of the warranty. The court, however, considered such evidence irrelevant, evidently assuming that once a warranty is found,
an explosion of the bottle which results in injury automatically constitutes an actionable breach. The court's summary treatment of this
argument is dangerous for it may be taken to equate the warranty of
merchantability with a guarantee that the bottle is accident-proof. 20
Passage of Title-Payment by Dishonored Check.-A simple
issue that is not covered by the Uniform Sales Act and which has
never been resolved definitively by the New York Court of Appeals
is whether title to goods passes where the vendee pays for them with
a check that is subsequently dishonored because the drawer's bank
account was in.sufficient.30 In Stanton Motor Corp. v. Rosetti31 a used
car dealer authorized an employee to purchase cars up to the value
of $150. This agent was supplied with a check which was blank
except for the signature of the dealer. He offered the owner of an
automobile $2,650 for his car, and this offer was accepted. The agent
then completed the check in the amount of the purchase price and
gave it to the owner who in turn completed the necessary papers to
effectuate a transfer of the vehicle to the dealer. Subsequently, the
car was sold by the agent to a bona fide purchaser.
An action was brought to determine whether the original owner
or the bona fide purchaser had better title to the automobile. In deciding that the purchaser took good title, the court held that a void28. See Farnsworth, supra note 24, at 667.
29. See Natale v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 282, 182 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1st
Dep't 1959) (burden on plaintiff to account for bottle from time of purchase to accident).
30. See Comment, 24 Albany L. Rev. 195, 200 (1960).
31. 11 App. Div. 2d 296, 203 N.Y.S.2d 273 (3d Dep't 1960).
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able title had passed to the dealer upon payment of the purchase price
with the subsequently dishonored check. In following what is known
as the "Nebraska Rule," 32 the court cited Plzelps v. 1'.1cQuade33 as
supporting authority for its holding. Noted, however, were two
appellate division cases,34 both subsequent to the Plzelps case, which
may be construed as contrary to this holding.
II
BILLS AND NOTES

Although it appears that more than the usual number of cases
involving negotiable instruments were decided during the past year,
only two have been selected for inclusion herein. The others either
followed accepted rules of long standing or were decided primarily on
factual issues.
Payment of Check Over Stop-Payment Ordcr-Riglzt of Bank
vis-a-vis Payee.-Rosenbaum v. First N at'l City Bank3 r, presents an
interesting example of how an agreement designed to shield a party
from liability may become a sword in the hands of an antagonist. In
this case a depositor of the defendant-bank requested that payment be
stopped on a check. The bank, in accepting the stop-payment order,
apparently obtained from its depositor the usual agreement not to
hold the bank liable if the instrument were nevertheless paid. Subsequently, the check was presented by the plaintiff who asked for a
cashier's check instead of cash for the instrument. The bank complied
with the request, but upon discovering the stop-payment order, refused to pay the cashier's check when the plaintiff later presented it.
This action was commenced to recover the amount of the cashier's
check from the bank.
Recovery might have been allowed by a simple e.,.tension of the
Price v. Neal rule.36 This approach, adopted by a majority of jurisdictions37 which have considered cases similar to Rosenbaum, is neither
unreasonable nor unrealistic. If a bank is bound as a matter of law
to know the signatures of its depositors, it is difficult to see why it
should not also be conclusively presumed to know the status of their
accounts. Actually, with the advent of automation in the banking
32. See Sullivan Co. v. Larson, 149 Neb. 97, 30 N.\V.2d 460 (1948).
33. 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917), affirming 158 App. Div. 528, 143 N.Y.
Supp. 822 (1st Dep't 1913).
34. Damis v. Barcia, 266 App. Div. 698, 40 N.Y.S.2d 107 (3d Dep't 1943) (mem.),
and Amols v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 469, 212 N.Y. Supp. 518 (1st Dep't 1925).
35. 13 App. Div. 2d 100, 213 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1st Dep't 1961).
36. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
37. Britton, Bills and Notes § 137 (2d ed. 1961).
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business, it appears that there is more validity in holding a financial
institution to a knowledge of the accounts it keeps than to assume that
it has an opportunity to check against forged signatures.
The court, however, construed earlier Court of Appeals decisions38 as holding that where a check is paid over a stop-payment
order the payor-bank may recover from the payee, or, as in this case,
resist payment of an instrument given in exchange for the check, so
long as the payee has not changed his position. If the Rosenbaum
case merely reiterated this doctrine, it would be important only as a
reaffirmation of an ill-considered rule, but the opinion attempts to
amplify the previous New York cases and to limit their applicability.
The right of the drawee-bank was held dependent upon a showing
that the bank suffered a loss as a result of honoring the check. The
court in the Rosenbaum case held that no damage could be shown by
the defendant-bank. The exculpatory clause in the stop-payment order
permitted the bank to debit the drawer's account even though it had
wrongfully paid over the stop-payment order.
The result reached by the court unquestionably furthers "the
policy of maintaining confidence in the security of negotiable paper
by making the time and place of acceptance or payment the time and
place for the final settlement, as between drawee and holder ...." 00
It is also a desirable result from the standpoint of uniformity.40 The
rationale of the court is less satisfactory. Apparently the result would
have been different had the bank not "protected" itself by procuring
a release of liability from its depositor. Thus, the decision hinges
upon the proposition that the payee, a third party to the release,
may use it to establish that the bank did not suffer a detriment. This
appears akin to denying a plaintiff recovery because he has insured against the risk. In addition, although New York courts have
held exculpatory clauses valid,41 the litigation that they continue to
38. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of United States, 259 N.Y. 365, 182 N.E.
18 (1932); Mount Morris Bank v. Twenty-third Ward Bank, 172 N.Y. 244, 64 N.E.
810 (1902); Irving Bank v. Wetherald, 36 N.Y. 335 (1867). For a case decided during
the Survey period on this question, see ~nternational Press Clipping Bureau, Inc. v.
American Trust Co., 28 Misc. 2d 638, 208 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. Ct., App, T., 1st Dep't
1960).
39. Woodward, Quasi Contracts 137 (1913).
40. See note 37 supra. The Uniform Commercial Code §§ 3-417, 4-207, adopt
the doctrine of Price v. Neal, but apparently restricts its operation to cases in which
payment has been made over the forged signature of the drawer. See Hawkland, Commercial Paper 4 (1959). Uniform Commercial Code § 4-407 permits a bank which has
paid out over a stop-payment order to use subrogation as a means of preventing
unjust enrichment.
41. See, e.g., Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N.Y. 152, 167 N.E. 203 (1929); Scldowitz v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 202 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st Dep't
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breed42 casts doubt upon the court's assumption that they fully protect the drawee-bank.
Holder in Due Course-Forgotten Notice.-The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law defines a holder in due course as one who,
among other things, takes an instrument with no notice of any infirmity in it or defect in the title of the party negotiating it.-1 3 One of
the problems raised by this requirement is whether a person can hold
in due course if he was once given notice but had forgotten it at the
time he took the instrument. First Nat'l Bank v. FazzariH held that
he cannot. The defendant in this case orally informed a teller at the
plaintiff-bank that he had been tricked into making a note payable
to a specified third party. Some three months later the bank, having
forgotten the notice, purchased the instrument. In the suit to recover
on the note, the bank failed to prevail on the ground that it was not
a holder in due course and the maker's personal defense was thus
effective.
It is arguable that the holding has merit,-1 6 but the opinion fails
to meet the fundamental questions raised by resorting to technical
arguments which are, in themselves, open to criticism. Apparently,
the court believed the statute should be literally interpreted, and that
a clear reading of it required that recovery be denied. Emphasis was
placed on that part of the section which states that one is prevented
from being a holder in due course if be had notice, but a clause which
provides that such notice must exist at the time the instrument is
taken apparently received little weight:16 In addition, the opinion fails
to consider the effect of a later section which, in defining notice, indicates that it is generally equivalent to actual knowledge.-1 1 'When these
aspects of the statutory language are considered, and the interrelation
between good faith and notice is recognized,4 8 considerable doubt is
cast on the court's interpretation of the section.
1960). It appears that the Uniform Commercial Code [§ 4-103(1)] holds such clauses
unenforceable. See Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954).
42. E.g., Seldowitz v. Manufacturers Trust Co., supra note 41; Capritta , •• National Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 26 Misc. 2d 71, 206 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Albany City
Ct. 1960).
43. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 52(4).
44. 13 App. Div. 2d 582, 212 N.Y.S.2d 380 (3d Dcp't 1961) (mcm.).
45. See Britton, Bills and Notes § 107 (2d ed. 1961).
46. The section, in part, reads: "That at the time it was negotiated to him he had
no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect . • . ." N.Y. Negotiable Instr.
Law § 91.
47. N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 95. See Uniform Commercial Code § 3-304,
comment 2 (May 1949 Draft).
48. See Fagan, Notice and Good Faith in Article 3 of the U.C.C., 17 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 176 (1956).
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The court also resorted to a convenient but unsatisfactory argument to dispose of a contrary supreme court case, Lord v. Wilkinson.49 That case was quickly dismissed as not controlling on the ground
that it was decided prior to the enactment of the applicable statute.
If there existed some manifestation of legislative intent to overrule the
Lord case, this might be sufficient to require a perfunctory rejection
of its rule and reasoning, but there is no such indication. In fact, the
case has been quoted, the rationale approved and the holding followed
in the leading case50 on this question decided under the uniform act.
III
SECURED TRANSACTIONS

The legislature passed the usual number of technical amendments
to both the statutory provisions controlling security devices51 and to
retail sales contract legislation.62 The most important judicial action
was a case53 decided by the Court of Appeals which helps clarify the
effect of Sections 5 and 9 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
Double Financing-Conditional Sales for Resale.-Last year's
Survey54 discussed at some length the appellate division opinion in
Rand's Discount Co. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. 55 This case has
now been affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an opinion which accepted the rationale of the appellate division based on common law
estoppel. However, the court went on to consider the interrelationship
49. 56 Barb. 593 (N.Y., Sup. Ct., Broome Co. 1870).
50. Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 296 U.S. 27, 32 (1935).
51. Trust Receipts: (1) Period within which entruster may perfect bis security
decreased from 30 to 21 days, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 57(1) (a), 58(1)-(2) 1
58-a(2), 58-e(4) (McKinney Supp. 1961). (2) Provision for demand of information
regarding trustee's interest added, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 58-c(6) (McKinney Supp.
1961).
Chattel Mortgages: (1) Recording in Nassau County, N.Y. Lien Law § 232
(McKinney Supp. 1961). (2) Refiling, N.Y. Lien Law § 235 (McKinney Supp, 1961),
Conditional Sales: (1) Deficiency judgment, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 80-b (McKinney Supp. 1961). (2) Refiling, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 71 (McKinney Supp. 1961),
52. Assignment of wages prohibition, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 413(10) (McKinney Supp. 1961); application to financing agents, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 401(8); definition of financing agents amended, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 401 (18) (McKinney Supp.
1961); effect of voluntary return of goods, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 302(10) (McKinney Supp. 1961). For one of the first cases on these acts, see Bankers Commercial Corp.
v. Murphy, 28 Misc. 2d 609, 207 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st Dep't 1960)
(interest rate determined by face amount, not balance after each installment paid).
53. Rand's Discount Co. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 9 N.Y.2d 454, 174
N.E.2d 599, 214 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1961).
54. Hart, Commercial Law, 1960 Survey of N.Y. Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1477,
1481.
55. 10 App. Div. 2d 240, 198 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1st Dep't 1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d
454, 174 N.E.2d 599, 214 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1961).
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of the filing requirements for ordinary conditional sales contractsGO
with those that govern conditional sales contracts for resale.GT New
York courts had never before reconciled these sections of the Personal
Property Law.
Section 65 of the Personal Property Law establishes the filing
requirements for conditional sales contracts, but exempts from its
operation conditional sales for resale. Such resale contracts are governed by section 69 which provides, in part, that no filing is effective
as against "purchasers . . . for value in the ordinary course of business." Two important determinations were made by the Court of
Appeals: (1) purchasers for value in the ordinary course of business,
as used in section 69, does not include subsequent chattel mortgagees;
and (2) the exclusion contained in section 65 applies only to those
cases where the purchasers (here the term includes subsequent chattel
mortgagees) are protected by section 69.
56. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 65 (almost identical with § 5 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act).
57. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 69 (almost identical with § 9 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act).
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